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Abstract
In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors 
to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds 
deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements 
(and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multi-
ple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We 
test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, 
which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. With-
drawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.
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1 Introduction
Mitigating the potential for bank runs has not been an important policy concern in 
developed economies since the Great Depression. Interest in financial fragility has 
peaked in recent years, however, with the 2007–2009 financial crisis, which was her-
alded by a run on the British bank Northern Rock. In distinction to earlier episodes 
of bank runs, the run at Northern Rock was initiated not by a panic among small 
retail depositors, but by large institutional investors who stopped rolling over short 
term loans and lending on the overnight market.
For the case of Northern Rock, Shin (2009) finds that the coordination failure 
among these institutional investors was the prime source of the breakdown of lend-
ing, leading eventually to bankruptcy. Other financial institutions (such as the US 
investment bank Bear Stearns and the US insurer AIG) suffered a similar fate.1 
Thereafter, retail banks, such as DSB Bank in the Netherlands or Bankia in Spain, 
were also run. While deteriorating fundamentals are a prime cause of bank runs, 
there was often a substantial self-fulfilling component in the depositors’ behavior. 
Depositors hurry to withdraw fearing that other depositors will also do so, and if 
they arrive late, they risk to lose their deposits.
In order to prevent bank runs (on fundamentally healthy institutions) caused by 
miscoordination, we propose a new procedure. We show that this procedure elimi-
nates bank runs in the theoretical model as well as reduces its occurrence in labo-
ratory experiments. Our analysis is based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s semi-
nal paper in which depositors play a simultaneous-move coordination game.2 This 
model yields two symmetric equilibria: (i) a bank run, when everybody rushes to 
withdraw from the bank, and (ii) no bank run, when only those who need liquid-
ity withdraw. This model adequately captures some real situations in which deposi-
tors do not observe each other’s actions.3 In many situations, however, depositors 
decide sequentially and receive some additional information before making a deci-
sion. Therefore, in this paper we allow depositors to move sequentially. Empirical 
studies show that depositors’ choices are sometimes observable and affect subse-
quent depositors’ decisions. Grada and Kelly (2000), Iyer and Puri (2012), Iyer 
et al. (2016) and Atmaca et al. (2017) study observability in one’s social network or 
neighborhood: observing that others withdraw (keep their funds deposited) increases 
(decreases) the likelihood of withdrawal. These studies suggest also that depositors 
observe withdrawals more broadly than holding funds in the bank.
Starr and Yilmaz (2007) show that in a bank run episode in Turkey in 2001 
small and medium-sized depositors seemed to observe only their peers’ with-
drawals. Large depositors, however, also observed each other when opting to 
1 In all three cases, miscoordination and a liquidity crisis were accompanied by worsening fundamentals, 
triggering the breakdown of lending, finally leading to bankruptcy. Yet, nowadays, AIG is again a profit-
able insurer and Bear Stearns forms part of JP Morgan Chase, while Northern Rock was acquired by 
Virgin Money.
2 A large part of the literature maintains this assumption (see, for example Ennis and Keister 2009a).
3 This was the case, for example, during the silent run on Washington Mutual in 2008, when depositors 
withdrew their funds electronically.
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keep their funds deposited. Since the large depositors generally observed no other 
large depositors withdrawing funds, they accounted only for a small share of total 
withdrawals. Observing each other helped large depositors to coordinate their 
actions and prevented them from running the bank. We introduce such a coor-
dination device in the form of announcements. More precisely, in one treatment 
depositors are allowed to announce (at a cost) that they are keeping their money 
in the bank—a decision that cannot be observed otherwise. Our goal is to study 
the effect of such announcements theoretically and test experimentally whether 
they foster coordination on the no bank run equilibrium.
Experimental studies highlight the importance of observability as well. For 
example, Kiss et al. (2014a), Davis and Reilly (2016), and Kiss et al. (2018) find 
that observing a withdrawal (rather than not observing anything) increases the 
likelihood of withdrawal, while the opposite holds when observing depositors 
keeping their money deposited.
Hence, there is evidence that observing other depositors keeping their funds 
in the bank helps to prevent inefficient withdrawals and bank runs caused by a 
coordination failure among depositors. Yet, observing this decision is more dif-
ficult than observing withdrawals. Queues in front of banks or ATMs represent 
this kind of asymmetric observability: it is quite likely that those seen queuing 
are intending to withdraw. However, it is unknown whether those not in the line 
will keep their money in the bank or not. Thus, withdrawals are more visible and 
easier to interpret.
Taking these empirical observations into account, in our study in the benchmark 
case, depositors can only observe withdrawals. In our analysis we introduce the pos-
sibility of publicly revealing to subsequent depositors the decision to maintain one’s 
funds deposited. Our goal is to study the effect of the enlarged strategy space on the 
likelihood of bank runs. Making public the decision to keep the funds in the bank is 
not standard practice in financial intermediation. Yet, recent technological advances 
may convert this theoretical idea into a practical tool. In our model, this tool allows 
depositors to announce publicly that they have kept their money in the bank. Simi-
larly, in the experiment we allow the subjects to make an announcement when keep-
ing their money deposited, while withdrawals are always publicly observable.
Shin (2009) identifies coordination failure of institutional investors as the main 
trigger of the bank run on Northern Rock, which possibly could have been prevented 
or mitigated by such a coordination tool. Both our theoretical and experimental 
results suggest that such a coordination device would have facilitated the coordina-
tion of investors in Northern Rock and other financial institutions on a concerted 
roll-over of the funding, thereby preventing a bank run.
In this paper we will not address the practical issue of designing and implement-
ing such a tool for retail banks and investors. However, our results indicate that such 
a tool would be desirable since participants in our experiment used it eagerly: even 
though it did not prevent bank runs entirely as predicted by theory, it reduced their 
occurrence in the experiment. Therefore, regulators, banks and other financial insti-
tutions might want to consider this idea in order to improve coordination among 
depositors in times of uncertainty and partial withdrawals.
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In our model depositors decide sequentially according to an exogenously given 
order.4 A depositor withdraws, keeps the money deposited and makes this choice 
public, or keeps her deposits in the bank without announcement. Making public the 
decision to keep the money in the bank is moderately costly (capturing opportunity 
cost of time or money, or the direct cost of announcing this to the bank in a legally 
binding way), costless or even monetarily compensated (for example, when sight 
deposits are converted into term deposits, they earn a higher interest). Depositors 
may find it appealing even to pay for such an announcement if this dissuades subse-
quent patient depositors from withdrawing and thereby avoiding a bank run.
We will show that in this model making public the decision to keep the money 
deposited strictly dominates withdrawal in relevant information sets, for any patient 
depositor. Henceforth, patient depositors know that no other patient depositor will 
withdraw in these information sets, and all of them keep the money deposited. Given 
costly announcements, in the unique equilibrium outcome patient depositors would 
not announce their decision to keep the money deposited:5 once all patient deposi-
tors have opted to keep their holdings in the bank and this is commonly known, all 
of them are better off saving the cost of making this public. Nevertheless, without 
this tool of publicizing the decision to keep the money deposited, there are multiple 
symmetric equilibria: apart from a no bank run equilibrium, there exists an equilib-
rium outcome in which patient depositors withdraw.
We test the theoretical predictions in the laboratory by designing two treatments: 
in the baseline treatment, subjects either withdraw (this action is observable by sub-
sequent depositors) or not (which cannot be observed), and in the public treatment, 
subjects additionally can publicly announce (at a fixed cost) that they have opted to 
keep the money deposited. In this paper we implement the most stringent (positive 
cost) scenario in the lab, because paying a positive cost for the announcement is a 
credible and binding way to communicate one’s decision to the other depositors. 
Moreover, a wide use of announcements would confirm our conjecture that sub-
jects might be willing to incur (a small) cost to induce other depositors to keep their 
money deposited.
Our conjecture in this line was confirmed by the results. Depositors use the costly 
announcements more frequently than predicted by theory, but reassuringly, not in 
an indiscriminate way. We also find that observing announcement(s) increases the 
rate of keeping the money deposited.6 In the experiment we observe that contrary 
to the theoretical prediction, withdrawal rates in the information sets that coincide 
5 If costs are zero or negative, in the unique no-run equilibrium outcome patient depositors would be 
indifferent between announcing or not, or would always announce their decision to keep the money 
deposited, respectively.
6 Given our experimental results, we did not take the other two cases to the lab: since in the most 
stringent case, in which both monetary incentives and theoretical predictions point against the use of 
announcements, we observe their use so frequently, we are confident that in the other cases depositors 
would use them frequently as well. In both of them, the theory and a potential monetary gain support 
this decision and hence should generate the same positive effect on reducing the withdrawal rates and the 
frequency of bank runs.
4 This is a standard assumption in the literature: see Green and Lin (2000, 2003), Andolfatto et  al. 
(2007), Ennis and Keister (2009b).
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in both treatments are not significantly different. Moreover, while theoretically we 
expect to observe no announcements, we find an extensive use of them in the lab. 
This in turn often translates into significantly lower withdrawal rates in information 
sets with announcements. Said announcements foster coordination on the no bank 
run outcome and our results show that this is effective: with announcements, the 
frequency of bank runs is significantly lower than without them, although the eco-
nomic relevance is debatable.
Although publicizing does not pay off individually—in the lab the costs of the 
announcements were not compensated by the implied benefits of fewer withdraw-
als, it increases significantly the total payoffs in those situations since it induces 
other depositors not to withdraw. In these cases, earnings are higher (though some-
times only marginally) in the public treatment. Furthermore, our results show that 
bank runs are significantly more likely to occur in the baseline treatment without 
announcements, though the differences, while statistically significant, are rather 
small.
1.1  Related literature
The degree of observability is studied theoretically, for example, by Peck and Shell 
(2003) who assume that the bank only observes withdrawals.7 In contrast, Green and 
Lin (2000, 2003) assume that each depositor contacts the bank and communicates 
her decision to withdraw or to keep funds deposited. We assume that withdrawals 
are observable (as in Peck and Shell 2003), while keeping the money deposited is 
not. However, following the idea of Green and Lin (2003) in our model keeping the 
money deposited can be made observable by the depositor at a cost.
Beyond the literature already mentioned, there are only few papers that assume 
sequential decisions of depositors. Ennis and Keister (2016) study such a setup 
with aggregate uncertainty about depositors’ liquidity types. Bank runs may arise 
when the bank and depositors observe withdrawals sequentially. In a model with-
out uncertainty regarding aggregate liquidity, Kinateder and Kiss (2014) assume 
that depositors decide sequentially and observe all previous choices before deciding. 
They study two setups: one in which the liquidity needs of previous depositors are 
observed, and another in which they are private information. In both cases, bank 
runs do not occur in equilibrium. These results suggest that sequential decisions 
may be successful in wiping out bank runs only in environments without aggregate 
uncertainty about liquidity needs.
In the experimental literature on bank runs, mainly simultaneous decisions have 
been studied to capture the coordination problem among depositors (see e.g. Ari-
fovic et  al. 2013).8 Assuming fundamental uncertainty about the bank’s health 
which is generally unobservable to depositors, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) 
7 Chari and Jagannathan (1988) show how a high withdrawal demand may be perceived incorrectly as a 
signal of the bank’s poor quality.
8 Brown et al. (2016) and Chakravarty et al. (2014) analyze whether bank runs are contagious if deposi-
tors can observe the decisions of other banks’ depositors.
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use simultaneous and sequential treatments and compare outcomes with different 
degrees of observability. They study how, for example, asymmetric information or 
deposit insurance affect the speed of withdrawals.9 Theoretically, the behavior of 
subjects should not depend on the form of the game, yet the available information 
affects subjects’ choices. Garratt and Keister (2009) forced part of the subjects to 
withdraw with some probability or gave subjects multiple opportunities to withdraw 
and informed them about any withdrawal. In this case, forced withdrawals combined 
with multiple opportunities to withdraw resulted in frequent bank runs. The authors 
claim that more information about other depositors’ decisions may be harmful for 
coordination. However, none of these papers consider the asymmetry of available 
information in the way we do.
At the heart of our paper lies the assumption that a patient depositor can cred-
ibly reveal that she has opted to keep her funds deposited. In reality, the closest 
mechanism to this is to commit not to withdraw the funds by having a sight deposit 
converted into a time deposit, although this is (currently) not observable by other 
depositors.10
The paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 presents a theoretical example with 
predictions that we test in the lab. Section 3 presents the experimental design and 
Sect. 4 contains our findings. Section 5 concludes.
2  Intuition of the theoretical model
In this section we develop in detail a simple example (based on the theoretical 
model) that was implemented in the lab. This example illustrates the underlying 
intuition and helps to derive the hypotheses of our experiment. Section B in the 
Online Appendix contains the formal analysis of the theoretical model in a general-
ized setting with the equilibrium predictions and the corresponding proofs.
Suppose that there are three patient depositors (without urgent liquidity needs) 
and one impatient one who needs to withdraw the money from the bank. Liquid-
ity type (patient vs. impatient) is private information. The number of patient and 
impatient depositors is commonly known. Following the literature (Diamond and 
Dybvig 1983; Green and Lin 2003; Ennis and Keister 2009a), we assume that there 
is no fundamental uncertainty about the return that the bank earns on its invest-
ments. Moreover, we let depositors decide sequentially: a decision-making sequence 
is the order in which the depositors decide if they want to withdraw their funds or 
keep them deposited and possibly announce this to subsequent depositors. In this 
example, there are four possible sequences, called type vectors (e.g., patient, impa-
tient, patient, patient). We study the least informative case, that is, each type vector 
9 Kiss et al. (2012) and Madies (2006) also study the efficiency of deposit insurance to curb bank runs in 
laboratory experiments.
10 Niinimäki (2002) proposes a model with time deposits in order to prevent bank runs. However, in his 
model, observability does not play any role.
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is equiprobable. Once the type vector is randomly selected, each depositor observes 
her own type but not her or any other depositor’s position in the queue.
We assume that all three patient depositors need to keep the money in the bank in 
order for this strategy to pay off for all of them. If a depositor keeps her funds depos-
ited and including herself three, two, or one depositor(s) do(es) so also, then her 
payoff is 125, 70, or 70 experimental currency units (ECUs), respectively. A deposi-
tor who is the first, second, or third to withdraw receives a payoff of 100 ECUs, 
while if she is the fourth (i.e. last) to withdraw, then she earns 60 ECUs. In this case, 
after observing three withdrawals, a patient depositor is better off keeping her funds 
deposited since it accrues interest and yields 70 ECUs.11
We consider two cases: when keeping funds deposited can be made public and 
when it cannot. In Table 1 we summarize the payoffs of withdrawal and keeping the 
money in the bank given the other depositors’ decisions. The announcement cost of 
10 ECUs should be deducted from the last column if a depositor keeps her funds 
deposited and makes an announcement to that effect.
2.1  The case with announcements
A patient depositor may withdraw, keep her money in the bank, or keep her money 
deposited and announce it to subsequent depositors. Keeping the money deposited is 
only observable if it is announced at a cost of 10 ECUs.
Here, our goal is twofold. First, we show that the unique perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the game does not yield a bank run (of any severity, measured as the number 
of withdrawals by patient depositors). Second, we then provide an understanding of 
why the mere availability of public announcements eliminates bank run as an equi-
librium outcome. A formal derivation of the results for any (positive, negative, or 
zero) fixed cost of announcement is relegated to section B of the Online Appendix.
We denote the decision to withdraw by wi, keeping the money deposited and 
making it public by kp , and keeping the money deposited without announcing it by 
k. The best response as a function of the previously observed decisions, in the exact 
order of how they were observed, is denoted by BR(⋅) . For example, BR(kp,wi) is 
the best response when a depositor observes that first, a depositor kept her money 
in the bank and announced it, and then another depositor withdrew her funds. How-
ever, since not all decisions are observable, the number of previously observed deci-
sions does not necessarily reveal one’s exact position in the queue. In this example, a 
depositor infers that she is third or fourth in the queue.
First, consider any information set that contains three previously observed 
choices. In these cases a patient depositor’s best response is uniquely deter-
mined and it does not include the use of public announcements, since she knows 
with certainty that she is last in the sequence. In particular, if she observes that 
two depositors kept the money in the bank and one depositor withdrew, then the 
11 That the last depositor’s dominant strategy is to keep her money in the bank is a feature of the Dia-
mond–Dybvig model (see Ennis and Keister 2010) also present in other bank run models, such as, Green 
and Lin (2003).
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optimal decision is to keep the money deposited without announcing it, earn-
ing herself 125 rather than 100 ECUs (corresponding to withdrawing).12 Hence, 
BR(kp, kp,wi) = BR(kp,wi, kp) = BR(wi, kp, kp) = k . When she observes that two 
depositors withdrew and the other kept her money in the bank, then the best response 
is to withdraw, yielding a payoff of 100 instead of 70 ECUs (corresponding to keeping 
the money deposited). Thus, BR(kp,wi,wi) = BR(wi, kp,wi) = BR(wi,wi, kp) = wi . 
The best response when observing three withdrawals is to keep the money depos-
ited, i.e., BR(wi,wi,wi) = k , since it yields 70 instead of 60 ECUs (corresponding to 
withdrawal).
In the same vein, if a patient depositor observes that two depositors have kept 
their funds deposited, she will know that she is third in the queue and there is only 
one impatient depositor behind who will withdraw for sure. In this case, her best 
response is to keep the money deposited without announcing it, yielding the maxi-
mum payoff of 125 ECUs. Therefore, BR(kp, kp) = k.
Now, if a patient depositor observes two withdrawals, she knows that she is either 
third or fourth in the queue. In the case of being in fourth place, after two with-
drawals (and one depositor who has eschewed withdrawal), the best she can do is 
to withdraw as this yields a payoff of 100 instead of 70 ECUs. If she were third in 
the queue, there might be a patient or an impatient depositor behind, but in any of 
the cases, at least one patient depositor in front will have withdrawn. Therefore, by 
keeping the money, the maximum payment to which she could aspire is 70 ECUs (or 
60 if she also announces this), while withdrawing would yield 100 ECUs. We con-
clude that after observing two withdrawals, a patient depositor’s dominant strategy 
is to withdraw, i.e., BR(wi,wi) = wi.
The four information sets that are left to analyze have no dominant strategy, yet 
the behavior in all of them is related. First, if a patient depositor observes that one 
depositor has kept the money in the bank (kp) , she infers that she is second or third in 
the queue.13 In this case, withdrawing yields a payoff of 100 ECUs, independently of 
the decision of the subsequent depositor(s). If instead, she keeps the money depos-
ited and announces this publicly, then she will earn 115 ECUs, because either there 
is no patient depositor behind her in the queue (i.e., she was third in the queue), or 
there is one patient depositor left (i.e., she was second in the queue) who observes 
the history (kp, kp) or (kp, kp,wi) . As just shown above, keeping the money without 
making it public is the best response to any history that contains two announce-
ments. Hence, in this case, our subject can be sure that the last patient depositor, by 
sequential rationality, will keep the money deposited. This means that keeping the 
money deposited and announcing it strictly dominates withdrawal given this history. 
Therefore, no patient depositor would withdraw after observing one announcement.
This result has strong implications for BR(kp,wi) : after observing a history with 
one announcement and one withdrawal, a patient depositor infers that the with-
drawal cannot be due to a patient depositor. As a consequence, a patient depositor 
12 Given the number of patient and impatient depositors, it is impossible that a patient depositor 
observes three depositors keep their funds in the bank.
13 She cannot be fourth, as in that case she would have observed at least one withdrawal.
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would rather keep the money in the bank and announce it than withdraw, earning 
115 ECUs (vs. 100 ECUs). We can be even more precise in this case. If no patient 
depositor withdraws upon observing (kp,wi) , then there is no point in making a 
costly announcement, so BR(kp,wi) = k . This would save 10 ECUs and the remain-
ing patient depositor in the queue, if there is one, will also keep her deposits in the 
bank.
Given the previous reasoning, we can explain the best strategy of a patient depos-
itor after observing nothing, i.e., BR(�) . Again, we will show that in this informa-
tion set, keeping the money in the bank and announcing it dominates withdrawal. 
We saw above that any patient depositor upon observing kp would not withdraw. 
On the other hand, the impatient depositor—independently of the history—always 
withdraws, and the subsequent patient depositor(s) would observe (kp,wi) . Finally, 
as just shown, BR(kp,wi) = k . This implies as well that any history that starts with 
a depositor keeping the money deposited and announcing it, leads to an outcome in 
which no patient depositor withdraws. Hence, after not observing anything, keeping 
the money deposited and making it public yields, by sequential rationality, a payoff 
of 115 ECUs, while withdrawing would yield only 100 ECUs. Thus, keeping the 
money and announcing it dominates withdrawal.
An important consequence of the above reasoning is that if the first observed 
decision is a withdrawal, then any depositor will conclude that this corresponds to 
the impatient depositor. Given BR(wi, kp, kp) = k and sequential rationality, a patient 
depositor will keep her funds deposited and announce it rather than to withdraw 
after observing a withdrawal followed by a depositor keeping funds in the bank 
(wi, kp) , as this will yield 115 instead of 100 ECUs. Moreover, if no patient deposi-
tor withdraws when observing (wi, kp) , then the best a patient depositor can do is to 
keep her funds without announcing it, so BR(wi, kp) = k.
Again, as a consequence, upon observing one withdrawal, a patient depositor—
attributing it to the impatient depositor—will prefer to keep her money in the bank 
and announce it to withdrawing. However, if no patient depositor withdraws upon 
observing a withdrawal, then there is no point in incurring the cost of announce-
ment; it suffices if patient depositors keep their funds without announcing it, so 
BR(wi) = k . Overall, this implies that a patient depositor who does not observe any 
previous decision keeps funds deposited without announcing it, i.e., BR(�) = k.
For any type vector, as the game unfolds, no information set arises in which the 
patient depositor would withdraw her funds. Hence, no bank run emerges. Notice 
Table 1  Payoffs corresponding 
to the different decisions, 
depending on others’ choices
Withdraw Keep money deposited
Number of previous 
withdrawals




1 100 1 125
2 100 2 70
3 60 3 70
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that we do not claim that withdrawing the money is not the best response for some 
information sets, but we assert that such information sets do not arise in equilibrium 
by applying sequential rationality.
In order to see that any other strategy profile is no equilibrium, consider the fol-
lowing one that would lead to a bank run: a depositor withdraws after observing 0, 
1 or 2 withdrawals and keeps the funds deposited otherwise. Is there a profitable 
deviation from this strategy? Assume that a patient depositor observes nothing and 
has to decide whether to follow the prescribed strategy profile or to deviate. Fol-
lowing the run strategy would yield 100 ECUs. Suppose that when no withdrawals 
are observed she deviates by keeping the funds deposited and making this public.14 
From the previous arguments we know that a patient depositor upon observing that a 
depositor has kept her funds deposited and announced doing so, is strictly better off 
keeping her funds deposited and announcing it rather than withdrawing, anticipating 
that the last patient depositor would follow suit.
Thus, if the deviating patient depositor is followed by an impatient depositor who 
withdraws, then by the previous arguments, the remaining patient depositors will 
identify this depositor as impatient, because a patient depositor upon observing kp 
would not have withdrawn. Similar arguments apply to the last patient depositor, and 
in the end, no patient depositor withdraws after observing a history that starts with a 
deviation of kp . Therefore, this deviation is profitable. Using best responses and the 
dominance argument it can be shown similarly, that no equilibrium strategy involv-
ing a patient depositor withdrawing can be constructed. Moreover, no announcement 
is observed in equilibrium.
2.2  The case without announcement
Next, we assume that keeping the money in the bank can neither be observed nor 
made public. Consider the previous case with four depositors, three of which are 
patient. It is easy to see that if depositors only observe withdrawals, then keeping the 
money deposited when observing 0, 1 or 3 withdrawals and withdrawing otherwise 
is an equilibrium that results in no bank run.
However, there exists another equilibrium, in which a bank run occurs, with the 
following strategies: withdraw if observing 0, 1 or 2 withdrawals and keep the funds 
deposited otherwise. It can be seen immediately that there are no profitable devia-
tions from any of the proposed strategies. Hence, in this case, there are multiple 
equilibria. The lack of profitable deviations is due to the fact that deviations can-
not be observed: if a patient depositor deviates, the other patient depositors will not 
notice it and will stick to the run strategy.
Summarizing, in the model where depositors can make public that they keep the 
money in the bank, there is a unique no-run equilibrium and announcements are 
never used. If only withdrawals are observable, there are multiple equilibria: besides 
the no-run equilibrium there exists a run equilibrium as well. Notice, that although 
14 If the patient depositor does not announce her behavior, then subsequent depositors would not observe 
it, and therefore, would not change their behavior.
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this difference may affect the emergence of bank runs, no bank run is an equilibrium 
outcome in both models. In the next section we test our theoretical findings in the 
laboratory.
3  Experimental design and results
3.1  Procedure
We recruited a total of 150 subjects (76 female and 74 male) without previous expe-
rience in experiments on coordination problems or on financial decisions. We ran 
four sessions at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX) 
at the Universidad de Valencia (Spain) in October 2015 and July 2017. On both 
dates, two treatments were implemented, one in each session: one corresponding to 
the baseline and another to the public treatment. The subjects were students from 
different disciplines at the university, of which only about 17% were studying Eco-
nomics or Business.15 No subject participated in more than one session (or treat-
ment). The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Instruc-
tions were read aloud at the beginning of each session and questions were answered 
privately. The experiment began once all participants had answered correctly three 
control questions regarding the experiment.
In the laboratory, a bank was formed by four depositors, each endowed with 80 
experimental currency units (ECUs). Three of the depositors were participants in 
the lab (patient depositors), while the fourth, the impatient one, was simulated by 
the computer. We explained that the impatient depositor always withdraws and that a 
subject’s payoff depends on her own and her co-players’ decisions.
In both treatments, we used identical payoffs (see Table  1), and in the public 
treatment, participants could reveal at a cost of 10 ECUs to subsequent depositors 
that they are keeping their funds deposited, as in the example analyzed in Sect. 2. In 
the instructions (see section C in the Online Appendix) we pointed out that the sub-
jects’ position in the queue is unknown. The instructions also explained that subse-
quent depositors can observe withdrawals and, in the public treatment, also holding 
the money whenever this is announced. By means of examples, we illustrated that a 
given observation might be compatible with several previous decisions, and hence, 
reveal important information.16
We only test the case when making public the decision to keep the funds depos-
ited has a positive cost. Based on the theoretical predictions, we conjecture that 
subjects would use announcements more intensively if costs were zero or nega-
tive. Therefore, if in the most stringent case—that is, with positive costs—patient 
15 On the first date, 25% of the participants were students majoring in Economics or Business, and on 
the second, this proportion was 12%. In section D of the Online Appendix we show in detail the compo-
sition of the subject pool.
16 For example, observing nothing is compatible with being in positions 1, 2 or 3; but it is not compat-
ible with being fourth in the queue.
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depositors’ withdrawals, and hence, the incidence of bank runs are significantly 
reduced, then we can conclude that it can be qualitatively appealing in all three 
cases. Moreover, the difference between the theoretical predictions of no announce-
ments and the subjects’ use of them is more striking in the case of positive cost.
In the experiments we use the strategy method and ask participants to decide in 
all possible information sets. This method allows us to capture nicely an important 
feature of our model: while depositors do not know their position in the queue, the 
decisions observed may reveal information about it. By asking subjects for decisions 
in all the positions they could occupy, we try to uncover their reasoning and prevent 
systematic mistakes. The use of the direct-response method might have led partici-
pants to make wrong inferences about their position in the queue, for example, based 
on the time elapsed before deciding or on the clicking sounds in the room. This 
would have contaminated the experiment. Moreover, the strategy method yields a 
large number of observations at a reasonable cost.17
Therefore, in the baseline treatment, subjects decide in four independent situa-
tions18 if they want to withdraw or keep the money deposited. In the public treat-
ment, they decide in five more situations,19—overall in nine scenarios—if they 
want to withdraw, to keep the money deposited, or to keep the money deposited 
and make it public. To avoid order effects, the different situations were displayed 
on the screen in a random order. At the end of each session, banks of four deposi-
tors (three participants and the computer) were formed randomly and anonymously. 
After determining the random order of the four depositors, the program calculated 
each participant’s payoff, taking into account the submitted decisions for the rel-
evant information structure.
Before finding out their earnings at the end of the experiment, subjects filled in a 
questionnaire so we have information about demographic and socioeconomic vari-
ables (sex, age, field of study, family income, trust in different institutions),20 cog-
nitive skills (using a new set of the cognitive reflection test, see Frederick 2005; 
Toplak et  al. 2014), and overconfidence by asking the subjects how many of the 
cognitive reflection test (CRT) questions they thought they had answered correctly. 
When asking about their trust in various institutions, we were especially interested 
in their attitude towards banks. We suspected that participants who distrust banks 
may be more prone to withdraw, which would distort our analysis if not taken into 
account.
17 Frequently, the strategy method is criticized since subjects decide in hypothetical situations, and thus, 
their choices resemble reality less than those under the direct-response method. Brandts and Charness 
(2011) find that generally there are no significant differences in the results using either method: if the 
strategy method detects a treatment effect, then this is detected by the direct-response method, suggesting 
that our design choice is appropriate. Although direct response has the advantage that through repetition 
subjects may learn to play optimally, as bank runs are rare events, learning is not a concern in our setting.
18 Namely, after observing nothing, one, two, or three withdrawals.
19 The same information sets as before, and additionally, after observing no withdrawal and one 
announcement, no withdrawal and two announcements, one withdrawal and one announcement, one 
withdrawal and two announcements and finally, two withdrawals and one announcement.
20 Family income is measured on a 0–10 scale on which each point represents a range of income. Trust 
in the different institutions is measured on a 0–10 scale as well.
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In the first two sessions, we measured risk attitudes by the Holt-Laury test (see 
Holt and Laury 2002), but as reported in the literature (see Crosetto and Filippin 
2016), there were many inconsistent choices (e.g., switching more than once or from 
the more risky to the safer lottery). Seemingly, many (certainly more than the aver-
age 15% reported in Crosetto and Filippin 2016) subjects mixed up their choices.21 
Given the low number of valid observations, we omit risk aversion from the analysis 
of the first two sessions.22 In the last two sessions, following Sutter et al. (2013), we 
use a variant of Ellsberg (1961)’s two-color choice task to measure risk aversion.23
Each session lasted approximately one hour. In the first two sessions, the sub-
jects received on average 10.64/11.8 Euros in the baseline/public session, includ-
ing a show-up fee of 1 Euro. In the other two sessions, the subjects earned 12/11.9 
Euros, respectively, including the same show-up fee. For the payment, ECUs were 
transformed into Euros using the exchange rate of 1 Euro for 10 ECUs.
3.2  Conjectures
To determine whether an option to make costly non-withdrawal announcements 
affects the emergence of bank runs, we compare the probability of withdrawals in 
both treatments. A bank run occurs if at least one patient depositor withdraws. The 
number of patient depositors who withdraw determines the severity of the bank run. 
If we observe fewer withdrawals, and hence, fewer bank runs (of any severity) in 
the public treatment, then we conclude that making public the decision to keep the 
money deposited is effective.
Conjecture 1 (withdrawals and likelihood of bank runs) Fewer bank runs will occur 
in the public treatment than in the baseline treatment.
Conjecture  1 is milder than the theoretical prediction according to which we 
should not see any withdrawal by patient depositors and no bank runs in the pub-
lic treatment. On one hand, this theoretical prediction relies on standard rationality 
arguments: each depositor is fully rational and believes the others to be so as well. 
Deviations from full rationality in experiments are frequent, and in our case, may 
lead to withdrawals. For this reason, we collected data on cognitive skills. On the 
other hand, there might be no big differences in withdrawal rates/bank runs across 
treatments, because no withdrawal (and consequently no bank run) is also an equi-
librium outcome in the baseline treatment. Moreover, the incidence of withdraw-
als and bank runs has direct consequences for the payoffs. Without withdrawals by 
21 Only 5/11 out of the 33 subjects in the baseline/public treatment start by choosing the less risky 
option and switch once to the more risky one as its expected value increases.
22 In a similar experiment, Kiss et al. (2014b) find that risk aversion does not help to predict depositors’ 
decisions.
23 In this task, there is an urn with 10 black and 10 red balls. Subjects are endowed with money and bet 
on one of the colors. If it matches that of a randomly drawn ball, the subject earns 2.5 times her bet, and 
otherwise loses it. The amount of the bet placed naturally measures risk aversion: the less a subject bets 
the more risk-averse she is.
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patient depositors, and therefore, no bank runs, we expect larger payoffs, both indi-
vidually and on aggregate (bank) level.
Conjecture 2 (use of announcements) No patient depositor will make a costly 
announcement of her decision to keep funds deposited.
Conjecture  2 captures the theoretical prediction, that the mere existence of the 
announcements should suffice to wipe out bank runs. If we relax the assumption that 
depositors are fully rational, then we may observe some announcements.
4  Experimental results
First, we provide some descriptive statistics about withdrawal decisions. Since there 
is no significant difference in the observable characteristics of the subjects across 
dates in the treatments, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to detect any sig-
nificant differences in the distribution of decisions in any of the information sets of 
the two treatments across dates, we pool the data of the same treatments and present 
them in Table 2.2425
There are four information sets that coincide in both treatments and can be com-
pared directly. The corresponding decisions are represented in the first four lines of 
Table 2. Given the payoffs, after observing two withdrawals, a patient depositor’s 
dominant strategy is to withdraw (and earn 100 instead of 70). In a similar vein, 
after observing three withdrawals, it is a dominant strategy for her to keep her funds 
deposited (and earn 70 instead of 60). While these information sets allow us to infer 
whether subjects make the optimal decision when it is available, we are mainly inter-
ested in the information sets when nothing or one withdrawal is observed which are 
present in both treatments. Since these information sets materialize at the beginning 
of the sequence of decisions, they are key to understanding why bank runs arise.
First we analyze whether the data confirm Conjecture 1. Table 2 reveals minor 
differences in the withdrawal rates in the coincident information sets. This sug-
gests that the observational asymmetry does not affect depositors’ decisions in these 
information sets.
Result 1 (withdrawal rates) The availability of announcements does not lead to sig-
nificantly different withdrawal rates in the information sets that are common in the 
two treatments.
Statistical evidence For each shared information set, we separately test the null 
hypothesis that withdrawal rates are equal against the alternative that withdrawal 
24 Section D in the Online Appendix contains the results of randomization.
25 When we pool non-withdrawal decisions, the test of proportions and the Wilcoxon ranksum test reveal 
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rates in the baseline treatment are higher. The test of proportions fails to reject the 
null hypothesis for any of the four information sets (p value > 0.37 in all cases).26
Note that in the public treatment according to the theoretical prediction the fre-
quency of non-withdrawals should be 100% for the first two information sets in 
Table 2. The predictions are based on the common knowledge of rationality. It may 
be violated at least in two ways. On the one hand, participants may not be fully 
rational. On the other hand, even if a participant is fully rational, she may doubt 
about the rationality of the other participants. Next, we investigate briefly these two 
possibilities.
In order to assess the participants’ rationality in the experiment, we check 
whether they choose the dominant strategies in the information sets in which they 
exist. Withdrawing is a dominant strategy after observing two withdrawals, and 
indeed, this information set has the highest withdrawal rate in both treatments. After 
three withdrawals, keeping the money deposited is strictly dominant and the with-
drawal rate in this case turns out to be the lowest in both treatments. 52% of the par-
ticipants chose the dominant strategy in both cases and only 6% never did so. Hence, 
94% of the participants is at least partially rational.27
Doubting about the rationality of the other participants is akin to being uncer-
tain about how those co-players will play, so it can be viewed as a case of strate-
gic uncertainty. If a participant does not believe that the other participants under-
stand that withdrawal is a dominated action, and moreover, no announcement 
should be made in the first best, then she might decide to use announcements or 
simply withdraw and secure a sure payoff of 100. As an extreme case, assume that 
a participant who decides upon observing nothing, believes to be in position 1 and 
that the other patient depositors in the bank decide randomly between withdraw-







u(70) . Hence, even if every participant is fully rational but 
there is uncertainty about the rationality (and therefore the choice) of other partici-
pants, we may observe frequent withdrawals in information sets characterized by 
strategic uncertainty. The mere availability of public announcements does not help 
to overcome this problem. However, the actual use of announcements may help, as 
it reveals clearly that a patient depositor has kept her money in the bank, eliminating 
strategic uncertainty about her choice.
Table 2 highlights the importance of announcements. Our findings about the use 
of announcements are summarized in Result 2.
Result 2 (use of announcements and withdrawals) When comparing information 
sets that only differ in observing announcements, we find that withdrawal rates are 
always lower in those that include announcement(s). These differences are signifi-
cant when information sets differ in two announcements, but generally fail to be sig-
nificant if the difference is only one announcement.
26 In section E in the Online Appendix, we repeat the same analysis for the two dates separately and 
report very similar results.
27 In section F of the Online Appendix we provide a more thorough analysis of rationality.
888 M. Kinateder et al.
1 3
Statistical evidence To assess the importance of announcements, we compare 
the withdrawal rates in the five information sets that differ only in the observation 
of announcement(s).28 We carry out two sorts of comparisons. First, we use all the 
observations (pooling data from the baseline and the public treatments) to compare 
information sets with and without announcements. Second, we restrict our analysis 
to the public treatment and carry out the previous comparison only for observations 
from this treatment.
Withdrawing is a dominant strategy in both treatments for the information sets 
with two withdrawals or with two withdrawals and one announcement. Hence, 
in the comparison of these information sets announcements should not matter. 
Our data confirm this, as the two-sided test of proportions fails to detect any sig-
nificant difference in any of the two comparisons (p values > 0.47 in both cases). 
When comparing the information sets nothing vs. one announcement, the with-
drawal rate is lower in the information set with one announcement but the dif-
ference is not significant (two-sided test of proportions, p values > 0.47 in both 
cases). The comparison between one withdrawal vs. one withdrawal and one 
announcement does not yield a significant difference when considering only the 
public treatment (two-sided test of proportions, p value = 0.19), but a weak sig-
nificant difference with the expected sign (two-sided test of proportions, p value 
< 0.09), if we consider observations from the baseline treatment as well.29 When 
Table 2  Breakdown of non-withdrawal decisions in each information set in both treatments
The notation (wi)/ (k) in the first column denotes that the dominant strategy is to withdraw/ keep the 
money deposited after the given observations









Nothing 69.3 66.7 36.0
1 Withdrawal 45.3 48.0 25.0
2 Withdrawals (wi) 33.3 28.0 4.6
3 Withdrawals (k) 77.3 78.7 3.4
1 Withdrawal, 1 announcement – 58.7 29.6
1 Withdrawal, 2 announce-
ments (k)
– 89.3 23.9
2 Withdrawals, 1 announce-
ment (wi)
– 33.3 27.9
1 Announcement – 72.0 55.6
2 Announcements (k) – 86.7 27.7
28 These are the following: (1) nothing versus one announcement; (2) nothing vs. two announcements; 
(3) one withdrawal versus one withdrawal and one announcement; (4) one withdrawal versus one with-
drawal and two announcements; (5) two withdrawals versus two withdrawals and one announcement.
29 If we apply a one-sided test, assuming that withdrawal rates are lower in the presence of the 
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comparing the information sets nothing vs. two announcements, and one with-
drawal vs. one withdrawal and two announcements, then withdrawal rates in the 
latter cases are considerably lower. Indeed, in all cases, using the two-sided test 
of proportions we find a significant difference at the 1% level.
Based on the theoretical results for the public treatment, Conjecture 2 predicts 
that patient depositors should neither withdraw nor use announcements. However, 
in the laboratory we find that depositors use announcements actively. Overall, this 
indicates that in the lab it is not the availability of announcements per se that 
matters, but it is its active use that leads to fewer withdrawals, and therefore, to 
fewer bank runs. This is in line with our previous reasoning that announcements 
are used to dissipate strategic uncertainty. Once such uncertainty is eliminated 
(that is, two announcements are observed) withdrawal rates drop considerably.
Result 3 (use of announcements) Depositors make costly announcements more fre-
quently than theory predicts.
Statistical evidence The third column in Table 2 shows the frequency of non-
withdrawals for the different information sets in the public treatment, and the last 
column contains the relative use of announcements. When two or three with-
drawals are observed and the corresponding dominant strategies (withdrawal and 
keeping the money in the bank without announcing, respectively) are unique and 
do not include the use of announcement, these are hardly ever used. In the pooled 
data, at the 1% and 5% significance levels, zero (i.e., using no announcement) 
is included in the confidence interval if two or three withdrawals are observed. 
Hence, in these cases we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the probability of 
using announcements is zero.
At the 99% confidence level, in the other information sets, the probability of 
using announcements is significantly positive for the pooled data. Contrary to the 
theoretical prediction, participants use announcements actively. However, its fre-
quency tends to decrease with the number of observed decisions. This suggests 
that subjects use announcements as an instrument to induce subsequent patient 
depositors not to withdraw, by decreasing/eliminating strategic uncertainty.
In general, the rate of announcements is lower than that of just keeping the 
funds deposited (that is, the percentage in the last column in Table 2 is less than 
50%) and the difference is significant at the 5% level according to the test of pro-
portions (except when one announcement is observed, p value > 0.3). This indi-
cates that despite being used extensively, announcements are still used less fre-
quently than keeping the money in the bank without announcement.
To provide further evidence on the effect of the availability and use of 
announcements, we run linear probability regressions both with and without indi-
vidual characteristics gleaned from the questionnaire. We relegate the detailed 
analysis to Appendix A, and summarize here the main findings. Withdrawal 
rates drop significantly, ceteris paribus, when at least two announcements are 
observed. When the effect of announcements is significant, the probability of 
withdrawal decreases by 20–23 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Similar to the 
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results seen before, the information sets with one announcement do not have a 
significant mitigating effect. These results are in line with our previous conclu-
sions: the availability of announcements changes only slightly the behavior in the 
information sets that coincide in both treatments, but it does have a large effect 
on creating information sets that contain announcements. This indicates to sub-
sequent depositors that previous depositors have kept their money in the bank. 
None of the individual characteristics that we consider affect significantly the 
withdrawal decisions.
Although announcements should never be used according to theory, empirically 
this improves efficiency if the overall payoffs are larger when announcements are 
used. As indicated before, participants are not fully rational, and moreover, might 
not be sure how (ir)rational their co-players are. Therefore, they may use announce-
ments to ensure that others do not withdraw either. If this convinces a subsequent 
participant not to withdraw, then it is a welfare-enhancing decision. To see whether 
announcements have such beneficial effects, we calculate the expected payoffs form-
ing all possible banks, following the method of recombinant estimation.30
In Table  3, we restrict our attention to the information sets without a domi-
nant strategy (where a persuasive announcement may result in larger payoffs). We 
observe that the use of announcements does not increase the average expected indi-
vidual payoff in those information sets. Making public the decision of keeping the 
money in the bank increases significantly the expected total payoffs—in a statisti-
cal sense—in 3 out of 4 cases. Hence, the use of announcements is efficient from 
a social point of view. However, the economic significance is only meaningful 
(8.7–9.6 ECUs, about 3% of the total payoffs) in half of the cases (when nothing/
an announcement is observed). If we analyze the distribution of payoffs, taking into 
account all information sets and decisions (i.e., the ones with a dominant strategy as 
well), then expected total payoffs in the baseline treatment (382.1) are higher than in 
the public one (380.2), due to the irrational overuse of announcements. Again, the 
difference is statistically significant, but economically less relevant.
The recombinant method also allows us to study the incidence of bank runs. A 
bank run occurs if, besides the impatient depositor, at least one of the patient deposi-
tors withdraws her money.
Result 4 (likelihood of bank runs) In the public treatment the frequency of bank 
runs is lower than in the baseline treatment. Hence, the availability (and eventually 
the use) of announcements reduces the likelihood of bank runs, though the economic 
relevance is questionable.
Statistical evidence In the public treatment, the frequency of no bank runs 
(when none of the patient depositors withdraws) is 22.13% while in the base-
line treatment, without the existence of announcements, the same frequency is 
21.21%. Although the magnitude of the difference is small, and therefore, the 
30 For details see Mullin and Reiley (2006) and Abrevaya (2008). We relegate the details of the compu-
tation to the section H in the Online Appendix.
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economic importance of this finding seems to be limited, the chi-square test indi-
cates that the difference between treatments is statistically significant (p value < 
0.001).
5  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the asymmetry in the observability of depositors’ 
decisions: as shown in several empirical studies, withdrawals are more eas-
ily observed than keeping the money deposited in the bank. Earlier theoretical 
results indicate that if all previous decisions could be observed, then no bank 
run based on depositors’ mis-coordination should arise in equilibrium. Hence, 
we set up a model in which withdrawals are always observed, while keeping the 
money deposited is not. Yet, we give depositors the opportunity to decrease this 
asymmetry in observability by allowing those depositors who keep their funds 
deposited to make this decision visible at a cost. Theoretically, depositors without 
urgent liquidity needs should not withdraw in this case, so a bank run is no longer 
an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, depositors should never use announcements, 
as their mere availability suffices to eliminate bank runs.
We test these predictions in the lab. In the baseline treatment, depositors 
decide whether to withdraw or not, with the first choice being observable, while 
the second not. In the public treatment, depositors may make public their decision 
to keep the money in the bank at a cost. Our results indicate that it is not so much 
the availability of announcements that is important—withdrawal rates are not sig-
nificantly different in information sets that are common in both treatments—but 
its use. Namely, announcements indicate that previous depositors have kept their 
funds in the bank. As a consequence, subsequent depositors are more likely to 
keep their funds deposited as well, and withdrawal rates are lower in information 
sets that contain announcements, the difference often being significant.
We interpret the extensive use of announcements as the depositors’ desire to 
coordinate on the no bank run outcome and our results show that this is effective: 
in the public treatment, the frequency of bank runs is significantly lower than in 
the baseline treatment (though admittedly the difference is rather small). We also 
find that using announcements compared to simply keeping the money in the bank 
does not pay off individually when accounting for the costs of doing so. However, 
total payoffs frequently increase significantly. It should be noted that while the 
difference is significant in a statistical sense, its economic relevance seems to be 
less pronounced. Further research is needed to shed light on whether depositors’ 
desire to coordinate yields more efficient outcomes in an economically mean-
ingful sense. Based on our theoretical results and the experimental findings, we 
answer the question posed in the title. Theoretically, depositors would like to have 
the opportunity to show others that they do not withdraw, but they would never 
actually do so if it were costly. The experiment suggests that depositors would not 
only like to have the opportunity, but they would use it extensively even if it had a 
(relatively small) fixed cost.
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